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Abstract—To provide system design insights for practical
communication systems equipped with the frequency diverse
array (FDA), this paper investigates the secrecy performance
of FDA systems exploiting finite-alphabet inputs over fluctuating
two-ray (FTR) fading channels. More specifically, closed-form
expressions for the average secrecy rate (ASR) and the secrecy
outage probability (SOP) are derived, while their correctness is
confirmed by numerical simulations. In addition, we perform
asymptotic analysis to quantify the secrecy performance gap
between Gaussian and finite-alphabet inputs, for a sufficiently
large average signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the main channel.
Compared with Gaussian inputs-based research, this letter fo-
cuses on practical scenarios which sheds lights on properties of
FDA systems.
Index Terms—Frequency diverse array, finite-alphabet inputs,
M -QAM, secrecy performance.
I. INTRODUCTION
As a charming aspect of wireless networks, physical layer
security (PLS) has aroused considerable attention from both
the academy and the industry [1]. In the field of PLS,
transmit beamforming (TB) is an important research topic
and frequency diverse array (FDA) is a typical hardware
architecture for realizing practical TB [2]. By properly setting
the frequency offset of each array element in an FDA, a
joint-range-direction-dimension beampattern can be realized in
contrast to the direction-dimension-only beampattern realized
by a conventional phased array (PA) [3]. Thus, PA systems
can only achieve secure communications in the direction
dimension, whereas FDA systems can achieve secure high-
data rate transmission in both range dimension and direction
dimension [2]–[6].
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On a parallel avenue, conducting secrecy performance anal-
ysis is fundamental for system engineers. By deriving the
exact or approximated expressions to characterize the average
secrecy rate (ASR) and the secrecy outage probability (SOP),
important system insights can be revealed and further be
exploited to improve the system design. As a pioneering
technology to guarantee PLS, FDA has gained much research
interest and its secrecy performance has been widely discussed
[4]–[6]. For instance, Hu et al. derived an analytical upper
bound for secrecy rate in FDA systems over additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN) channels [4]. Later, [5], [6] extended
the analysis in [4] to multi-path fading channels. Although
the aforementioned works are fascinating, their derived results
may be less referable for practical system design. In fact,
these works assumed the channel inputs follow Gaussian
distribution. Yet, as is well known, the input signals in modern
wireless communication systems are drawn from a set of
discrete finite alphabets, and thus they are non-Gaussian in
general [7], [8]. Hence, there is a strong need to analyze the
secrecy performance of FDA systems exploiting finite-alphabet
inputs. However, the results available so far in the literature
are greatly limited.
This study aims to investigate the secrecy performance of
FDA systems adopting finite-alphabet inputs so as to fill the
knowledge gap stated before. Specifically, a squared M -ary
quadrature amplitude modulation (M -QAM) scheme is con-
sidered due to its extensive applications in practical systems.
Most importantly, this work establishes a general analytical
framework for evaluating the transmission security in wiretap
fading channels having finite-alphabet inputs. Besides, we
incorporate the newly developed fluctuating two-ray (FTR)
fading model [9] into the analysis, which can capture a variety
of physical environments and holds a wide generality. Besides,
this model encompasses many classical statistical models as
special scenarios, such as Rayleigh, Nakagami-m, and Rician
fading [9]. Note that the PLS over FTR fading channels
was studied in [10], [11], but the derived results therein
were based on the assumption of Gaussian signaling instead
of finite-alphabet signaling. For other more general fading
channels such as the α-η-κ-µ fading channel [12], their secrecy
performance can be also discussed following the analytical
framework established in this paper, which will be left to our
future work.
To the best of authors’ knowledge, our work is the first
attempt to characterize the secrecy performance of FDA
2systems adopting discrete inputs, which offers novel and
important system design insights. Particularly, the unveiled
system insights are summarized as follows: 1) in high signal-
to-noise ratio (SNR) regimes of the main channel, the ASR
and SOP achieved by finite-alphabet inputs converge to finite
positive constants, and the rate of convergence is O (γ¯−1B ),
where γ¯B is the average SNR of the main channel; 2) FDA
systems outperform the PA systems in terms of PLS in the
range dimension, and the security achieved by an FDA can be
enhanced by increasing the frequency offset or the number of
antenna elements.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a multiple-input single-output single-antenna
eavesdropper (MISOSE) wiretap fading channel, where a
desired receiver (Bob) and an eavesdropper (Eve) are single-
antenna devices. Moreover, a transmitter (Alice) is equipped
with an FDA and its structure is shown in Fig. 1 [3]. For
the receiver at coordinate (r, θ), the transmit steering vector
adopted at Alice can be written as [5], [6]
v (r, θ) =
1√
N
[
1, e2πw(r,θ), · · · , e2π(N−1)w(r,θ)
]
, (1)
where N is the number of antenna elements,  is the imaginary
term, w (r, θ) = (f0d sin θ − r∆f ) /c, c is the light speed,
f0 is the carrier frequency, ∆f is the frequency offset, and
d is the inter-element space between antennas. Generally, d
is set to half of the wavelength, namely d = c2f0 [4]–[6].
Denote the coordinates of Bob and Eve as (ri, θi), i ∈ {B,E},
respectively. Based on [4]–[6], the received signal of Bob or
Eve can be written as yi =
√
P
√
Aihiv (ri, θi)p
†s + ni,
where (·)† is the conjugate transpose operator, P is the
transmit power, Ai = 1/A (f0, ri) is the free-space path loss,
ni ∼ CN
(
0, σ2i
)
is the additive white Gaussian noise with
power σ2i , s is the normalized unit-power transmittedM -QAM
symbol, hi is the FTR fading coefficient, and p ∈ C1×N (C
denotes the complex plane) is the precoding vector adopted at
Alice. To maximize the received SNR of Bob, Alice adopts
the maximum ratio transmission (MRT) scheme, namely p =
v (rB, θB) [4]–[6]. Thus, the instantaneous received SNRs γi
of Bob and Eve can be written as γi =
|hi|2|Θi|2P
σ2
i
A(f0,ri)
, where
Θi , v (ri, θi)v (rB, θB)
†
. We note that the MRT precoding
is generally a low-complexity suboptimal scheme. In fact, the
optimal precoding scheme for FDA systems having discrete
inputs still remains as an open problem. Thus, the analysis of
its secrecy performance will be considered in our future work.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the average small-
scale fading power E
{
|hi|2
}
equals one and thus the average
SNR is γ¯i =
|Θi|2P
σ2iA(f0,ri)
. Under the FTR fading, the probability
density functions (PDFs) and cumulative distribution functions
(CDFs) of γi are, respectively, given by [9]
fi (γi) =
mmii
Γ (mi)
∞∑
j=0
Kji d
(i)
j γ
j
i
j!j!uj+1i
exp
(
−γi
ui
)
, (2)
Fi (γi) =
mmii
Γ (mi)
∞∑
j=0
Kji d
(i)
j
j!j!
Υ
(
j + 1,
γi
ui
)
, (3)
Fig. 1. The structure of an FDA where the receiver is located at (r, θ). Note
that fi = f0 + i∆f , i = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1.
where d
(i)
j =
∑j
k=0
(
j
k
) (
∆i
2
)k∑k
l=0
(
k
l
)
Γ (j +mi + 2l− k)×
e
π(2l−k)
2 τ
− j+m2
i P
k−2l
j+m−1
(
mi+Ki√
τi
)
, τi = (mi +Ki)
2 −
(Ki∆i)
2
, and ui = 2λ
2
i γ¯i; Υ(·, ·) is the lower incomplete
gamma function [13, eq. (8.350.1)], P (·) is the associated
Legendre function of the first kind [13, eq. (8.702)], and Γ (·)
is the complete gamma function [13, eq. (8.31)]. Besides, Ki,
∆i, mi, and λ
2
i =
1
2(1+Ki)
denote the fading parameters [9].
On the other hand, for the Gaussian channel, i.e., yi =√
γis+ni, where ni is the normalized noise, one can express
the mutual information of M -QAM signaling as [7], [8]
IM (γi) = log2M −
1
Mπ
∑M
j=1
∫
y∈C
exp
(
− |y −√γisj |2
)
× log2
(
M∑
k=1
exp
(
|y −√γisj |2 − |y −√γisk|2
))
dy, (4)
where sj , j ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,M} denote the signals of M -QAM.
Thus, the instantaneous secrecy rate can be written as [10]
Is = Is (γB, γE) = max {IM (γB)− IM (γE) , 0} . (5)
In the sequel, we will first discuss the properties of FDA
systems and then derive the ASR and SOP to characterize
the system performance.
III. DISCUSSION ABOUT THE BEAMPATTERN
Using (1), the beampattern can be written as [5]
|Θi| = 1
N
∣∣∣∣∣sinNπ
(
1
2 [sin θi − sin θB]− 1c∆f∆r
)
sinπ
(
1
2 [sin θi − sin θB]− 1c∆f∆r
)
∣∣∣∣∣, (6)
where ∆r = ri − rB. For a PA system, we have ∆f = 0 [3],
and thus |ΘE| = |ΘB| = 1 always holds for θE = θB, which
means that a PA cannot improve the transmission security if
Bob and Eve are in the same direction. By contrast, in an
FDA system, we have ∆f > 0, and thus |ΘE| ≤ |ΘB| = 1
holds for θE = θB. By properly setting the values of ∆f and
N , an FDA can make |ΘE| < |ΘB| = 1 and even |ΘE| =
0, which can reduce the SNR of Eve and thus enhance the
transmission security. Therefore, FDA systems outperform PA
systems in the range dimension (θE = θB). On the other hand,
if θE 6= θB, |ΘE| can be designed to be smaller than |ΘB|
regardless of ∆f , and thus both PA and FDA systems can
improve transmission security in the direction dimension.
For the sake of brevity, we set θE = θB to discuss
more properties of the FDA. Under this set-up, we have
|Θi| = 1N
∣∣∣ sinNπ∆f∆rc
sinπ∆f∆r
c
∣∣∣ and find that the null points for
|ΘE| = 0 along the range dimension satisfy ∆r = kcN∆f (k ∈
Z, k 6= mN, m ∈ Z, Z denotes the integer set). Hence, the
distance between two neighbour null points is dnull =
c
N∆f .
To improve the secrecy performance, one effective method is
to increase the number of null points of Eve or to reduce dnull,
which can be done by increasing N or/and ∆f . On the other
3hand, L (x) = 1N
∣∣∣ sinNπ∆fxc
sinπ∆fx
c
∣∣∣ is a periodic function. In its first
least positive period
(
− c2∆f , c2∆f
)
, for x that falls outsides
the main-lobe
(
− cN∆f , cN∆f
)
, we have L (x) < 1N 1sin π
N
. We
find that 1N
1
sin π
N
decreases monotonically with N , and thus
using a large value of N can effectively suppress the side-
lobes of L (x). Thus, the received SNR of Eve that is located
in the side-lobes can get decreased by increasingN , which can
improve the security. In summary, the secrecy performance of
FDA systems can get improved by increasing N or/and ∆f .
IV. AVERAGE SECRECY RATE
A. Explicit Analysis
According to (5), the average secrecy rate is given by
I¯s =
∫ +∞
0
∫ +∞
γE
[IM (γB)− IM (γE)]
×fB (γB) fE (γE) dγBdγE. (7)
Yet, it is challenging to derive a closed-form expression of
I¯s as the Gaussian integration in (4) lacks any close-form
solutions [7]. Fortunately, by exploiting [7], IM (γ) can be
written as
IM (γ) = log2M ×
(
1−
∑kM
j=1
ζ
(M)
j e
−ϑ(M)
j
γ
)
+ EM (γ) ,
where kM , ζ
(M)
j , and ϑ
(M)
j can be found in [7, Ta-
ble I]; ζ
(M)
j > 0, ϑ
(M)
j > 0, and
∑kM
j=1 ζ
(M)
j = 1;
limγ→0EM (γ) = limγ→+∞EM (γ) = 0. Define IˆM (γ) ,
log2M ×
(
1−∑kMj=1 ζ(M)j e−ϑ(M)j γ). Then, when γB >
γE, the secrecy rate Is = IM (γB) − IM (γE) satisfies∣∣∣[IˆM (γB)− IˆM (γE)]− Is∣∣∣ < 2T(M), where T(M) ,
max0<γ<∞ |EM (γ)| can be found in [7, Table II] and thus
the ASR satisfies∣∣∣∣∣∣I¯s − log2M ×
kM∑
j=1
ζ
(M)
j P
(
ϑ
(M)
j
)∣∣∣∣∣∣ < 2T(M) Pr (γB > γE) ,
where P (ϑ) = ∫ +∞
0
∫ +∞
γE
(
e−ϑγE − e−ϑγB) fB (γB) fE (γE)×
dγBdγE. Based on [7], we have T
(M) = O (10−4),
which suggests that IˆM (γB) − IˆM (γE) can provide a
good approximation of Is. Moreover, due to the facts of
T
(M) = O (10−4) and Pr (γB > γE) < 1, it makes sense to
approximate I¯s as Iˆs = log2M ×
∑kM
j=1 ζ
(M)
j P
(
ϑ
(M)
j
)
, and
Iˆs − 2T(M) Pr (γB > γE) serves as a lower bound of I¯s.
To facilitate the derivation, we re-express P (ϑ) as
P (ϑ) = ∫ +∞
0
A3 (x) dx−
∫ +∞
0
A1 (x) dx−
∫ +∞
0
A2 (x) dx,
where A1 (x) = exp (−ϑx) fB (x)FE (x) dx, A2 (x) =
exp (−ϑx) fE (x)FB (x), and A3 (x) = exp (−ϑx) fE (x).
Since j + 1 are positive integers, Fi (γi) can be written as
[13, eq. (8.352.6)]
Fi (γi) =
mmii
Γ (mi)
∞∑
j=0
Kji d
(i)
j
j!
(
1−
j∑
q=0
e−γi/ui
γ−qi u
q
i q!
)
, (8)
Then, we substitute (2) and (8) into P (ϑ), and apply the
integral identity from [13, eq. (3.326.2)] to solve the resultant
integrals. Taken together, the expression of Iˆs is summarized
in (9) at the bottom of this page. Theoretically, both j and
k in (9) take all the integers in the range [0,+∞], which is
impractical for exact calculation. Fortunately, the first tens of
terms of j and k contribute most of the values to the results of
the computation and setting j, k ∈ [0, 40] can obtain extremely
high calculation accuracy [9]. Hence, we apply this technique
in calculating ASR and SOP.
B. Asymptotic Analysis
To show more system insights, this section will present an
asymptotic analysis on the ASR when γ¯B tends to infinity.
Based on (7), we can rewrite I¯s as
I¯s =
∫ ∞
0
IM (γ) [fB (γ)FE (γ) + fE (γ)FB (γ)] dγ
−
∫ ∞
0
IM (γ) fE (γ) dγ = −
∫ ∞
0
IM (γ) fE (γ) dγ
+
∫ ∞
0
IM (γ) d (FB (γ)FE (γ)) = log2M −
∫ ∞
0
FB (γ)
× FE (γ) dIM (γ)−
∫ ∞
0
IM (γ) fE (γ) dγ. (10)
By [13, eq. (8.354.1)], lim
x→0
Υ(s, x) = x
s
s +o (x
s), where o (·)
denotes the higher order term. Hence, for fixed γ, FB (γ) =
χBγ
γ¯B
+ o
(
1
γ¯B
)
as γ¯B → ∞, where χB = m
mB
B d
(B)
0
2λ2BΓ(mB)
. Define
SM (γ) , dIM (γ)dγ . Then the asymptotic ASR is given by
I¯∞s = I¯∞s −
∫ ∞
0
χB
γ¯B
γFE (γ)SM (γ) dγ + o
(
γ¯−1B
)
, (11)
where I¯∞s = log2M −
∫∞
0
IM (γ) fE (γ) dγ is a constant
that is solely determined by Eve’s channel condition. By
approximating IM (γ) as IˆM (γ), we can approximate I¯
∞
s
as I¯∞s ≈
∑kM
q=1
∑∞
k=0
log2M×mmEE ζ
(M)
j
KkEd
(E)
k
k!Γ(mE)
(
1+ϑ
(M)
j
uE
)k+1 aided with
[13, eq. (3.326.2)]. Besides, I¯∞s can be also calculated
by methods of numerical integration. Moreover, we have
limγ→0 SM (γ) = 1ln 2 [8] and limγ→∞ SM (γ) = o
(
e−dMγ
)
(dM =
3
2(M−1) > 0) [14], which together with [15, Section
4.2], yields
∫∞
0
γFE (γ)SM (γ) dγ < ∞. Thus, we obtain
I¯∞s = I¯∞s − ΨM γ¯−1B + o
(
γ¯−1B
)
or
∣∣I¯∞s − I¯∞s ∣∣ = O(γ¯−1B ),
Iˆs =
kM∑
q=1
∞∑
k=0
log2M × ζ(M)q mmEE KkEd(E)k
Γ (mE) k!
(
1 + uEϑ
(M)
q
)k+1 − log2M ×
kM∑
q=1
∞∑
j=0
∞∑
k=0
ζ
(M)
q m
mB
B m
mE
E K
j
Bd
(B)
j K
k
Ed
(E)
k
Γ (mB) Γ (mE) j!k!

 1(
uBϑ
(M)
q + 1
)j+1
−
k∑
l=0
Γ (l + j + 1)u−1−jB u
−l
E
l!j!
(
ϑ
(M)
q +
1
uB
+ 1uE
)l+j+1 + 1(
uEϑ
(M)
q + 1
)k+1 −
j∑
l=0
Γ (l + k + 1)u−1−kE u
−l
B
l!k!
(
ϑ
(M)
q +
1
uB
+ 1uE
)l+k+1

 (9)
4where ΨM = χB
∫∞
0
γFE (γ)SM (γ) dγ is a constant that
can be calculated numerically with the aid of [8]. We find
that as γ¯B increases, the ASR converges to a constant that
is solely determined by Eve’s channel quality and the rate
of convergence is O(γ¯−1B ). In contrast, for Gaussian inputs,
the ASR scales with γ¯B at the rate of O(log γ¯B) [8] which
suggests the performance gap between Gaussian and finite-
alphabet inputs.
V. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY
A. Explicit Analysis
The SOP is defined as the probability when the instanta-
neous secrecy rate is lower than a preset constant valueRs > 0
[10]. By its definition, we formulate the SOP as
Po (Rs) = Pr (Is (γB, γE) < Rs) . (12)
According to (5), (12) can be further simplified to
Po (Rs) = Pr (Is < Rs, γB > γE) + Pr (γB < γE) . (13)
Define I−1M (·) as the inverse function of IM (·). Although
I−1M (·) lacks an explicit expression, its value can be found
via a simple bisection search. The following lemma captures
the main result of SOP:
Lemma 1. Define H , I−1M (log2M −Rs) and φM (γ) ,
I−1M (Rs + IM (γ)). Then the SOP with discrete inputs is
Po (Rs) = 1− FE (H) +
∫ H
0
FB (φM (γ)) fE (γ) dγ. (14)
Proof: Please see the appendix.
Inserting (2) and (3) into (14) yields
Po (Rs) =1− m
mE
E
Γ (mE)
∞∑
j=0
KjEd
(E)
j
j!j!
Υ
(
j + 1,
H
uE
)
+
∞∑
j=0
∞∑
k=0
mmBB m
mE
E K
j
Bd
(B)
j K
k
Ed
(E)
k
Γ (mB) Γ (mE) j!j!k!k!u2E
Pk,
(15)
where Pk =
∫H
0 Υ
(
j + 1, φM (γ)uB
)
γk exp
(
− 1uE γ
)
dγ. Fur-
thermore, the integral in Pk can be effectively evaluated by
the Gauss-Legendre quadrature rule [16], namely
Pk ≈ H
2
V∑
i=1
ti
Υ
(
j + 1, 1uBφM
(H
2 ωi +
H
2
))
(H
2 ωi +
H
2
)−k
exp
(
1
uE
(H
2 ωi +
H
2
)) , (16)
where ti and ωi can be found in [16, Table 25.4]. Note that a
larger value of V indicates higher approximation precision and
V in this paper is set to 30 to achieve a promising accuracy.
B. Asymptotic Analysis
As stated before, limγ¯B→∞ FB (γ) = χB
γ
γ¯B
+ o
(
1
γ¯B
)
holds for fixed γ. Thus, as γ¯B →∞, (14) can be writ-
ten as P∞o (Rs) = 1 − FE (H) + ΦM γ¯−1B + o
(
γ¯−1B
)
,
where ΦM =
∫H
0 χBφM (γ) fE (γ) dγ. By applying the
change of the variable γ → ρM (x) = I−1M (IM (x) −Rs),
we obtain ΦM = χB
∫ +∞
I−1
M
(Rs)
xfE(ρM (x))
SM (ρM (x))
SM (x) dx. More-
over, we have limx→I−1
M
(Rs)
fE(ρM (x))
SM (ρM (x))
SM (x) = 0 [8] and
limx→∞
fE(ρM (x))
SM (ρM (x))
SM (x) = o
(
e−dMx
)
(dM > 0) [14],
which together with [15, Section 4.2], yields ΦM <∞. Note
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Fig. 3. SOP of M -QAM versus rB for (mB,∆B, KB) = (1, 1, 1),
(mE,∆E,KE) = (1, 1, 20), P = 17 dBW, N = 50, ∆f = 1 kHz,
θB = θE = 20°, and rE = 1.5 km.
that ΦM can be calculated by the Gauss-Legendre quadrature
rule. We find that as γ¯B increases, the SOP converges to
1− FE (H) > 0. Besides, the rate of convergence is O
(
γ¯−1B
)
or in other words, the order of convergence equals one. Based
on [11], for Gaussian inputs, Po (Rs) converges to zero as
γ¯B increases which indicates the performance gap between
Gaussian and finite-alphabet inputs. Yet, by [11], the order
of convergence (or the secrecy diversity order) for Gaussian
inputs equals one which is the same as that for discrete inputs.
VI. SIMULATION
To verify the derived analytical results, this part provides
some numerical simulations. In the simulation, f0 = 28 GHz
[9] and σ2B = σ
2
E = −140 dBm. Furthermore, the free-space
model is 10 log10 Ai (f0, ri) = 32.5 + 20 log10 [f0 (MHz)] +
20 log10 [ri (km)] [2, eq. (34)].
Fig. 2(a) compares the simulated and approximated ASR
of M -QAM versus rB. As shown, the simulations match per-
fectly with the approximations. Note that the free-space path
loss is considered in this work, and thus the average received
SNR of Bob is smaller for a larger distance rB. Therefore, as
rB decreases, the ASR gradually converges to its limitation,
namely I¯∞s , which consists with the results shown in Fig. 2(a).
For comparison, the ASR of Gaussian signal is also plotted. By
[17], Gaussian signals can maximize the difference of mutual
information over the main and eavesdropper’s channels. Thus,
Gaussian inputs outperform the discrete inputs in terms of
ASR. Moreover, as shown in Fig. 2(a), a lower modulation
order can achieve nearly the same secrecy level as a higher
modulation order in low SNR regimes. The reason lies in
that IM (γ) has similar asymptotic behavior regardless of M
when γ → 0 [8, eq. (92)], and thus different modulation
schemes can achieve virtual the same secrecy performance in
low SNR regimes. Then we plot ∆I¯∞s = I¯∞s − I¯∞s versus rB
in Fig. 2(b) to verify the asymptotic analysis on I¯s. In fact,
we have ∆I¯∞s = ΨM γ¯−1B + o
(
γ¯−1B
)
. As shown, the derived
asymptotic results match the simulated results perfectly in
high SNR regimes. Fig. 3 verifies the accuracy of derived
expressions of the SOP. We observe that as rB decreases, the
SOP gradually converges to its limitation, namely 1−FE (H).
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Fig. 4. ASR of 4-QAM for θB = 20°, rB = 1 km, (mB,∆B,KB) =
(2, 0.4, 10), and (mE,∆E,KE) = (5, 0.35, 5).
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Fig. 5. SOP of 4-QAM for Rs = 1 bps/Hz, ∆B = ∆E = 0.9, P = 15
dBW, ∆f = 2 kHz, θB = θE = 20°, rB = 1 km, and rE = 1.5 km.
Besides, as shown in Fig. 3, a higher modulation order yields a
smaller value of 1−FE (H). We comment that the asymptotic
behaviour of Po (Rs) is similar as that of I¯s. Due to the page
limitation, we do not present the simulations of P∞o (Rs).
Fig. 4(a) plots the ASR achieved by PA and FDA systems
versus ∆θ = θE − θB. For comparison, the ASR achieved
in a FTR fading channel without using antenna array is also
presented. As shown, both PA and FDA systems can improve
the transmission security in the direction dimension (θE 6= θB).
Yet, in the range dimension (θE = θB), only the FDA can
improve the secrecy performance, which means FDA systems
can achieve two-dimensional secure transmission. Fig. 4(b)
plots the ASR achieved by FDA systems when θE = θB for
selected values of∆f . As shown, the FDA outperforms the PA
in the range dimension and a larger value of ∆f yields a better
secrecy performance, which verifies the discussion in Section
III. Fig. 5 plots the SOP versus N . As shown, the security
can get improved via a larger array size, which consists with
our former discussions. By [9], K in the FTR fading model
denotes the power ratio between the dominant and remaining
diffuse multipath components, and a larger value of K yields
a better channel condition. Hence, the SOP can get improved
for a larger value of KB or a smaller value of KE, which
consists with the results in Fig. 5(a). Besides, a smaller value
of m corresponds to heavier channel fluctuations and yields a
worse channel condition [9]. Thus, the SOP can get improved
for a small value of mE, which is verified by Fig. 5(b).
VII. CONCLUSION
Novel expressions for the ASR and the SOP are derived to
evaluate the secrecy performance of the FDA-assisted wiretap
channels adopting finite-alphabet inputs. This work developed
a generalized framework for secrecy performance analysis in
wiretap channels driven by finite-alphabet signals. Based on
the derivations, the properties of the FDA were discussed to
offer important system design guides.
APPENDIX
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Proof: When Rs + IM (γE) > log2M , we have
IM (γB) − IM (γE) < IM (γB) − log2M + Rs < Rs,
which suggests that Is < Rs always holds when
γB > γE and Rs + IM (γE) > log2M . Moreover, when
Rs+IM (γE) ≤ log2M , we find that IM (γB)−IM (γE) < Rs
is equivalent to I−1M (Rs + IM (γE)) > γB. As a
result, we obtain Pr (Is < Rs, γB > γE) = W1 + W2,
where W1 =
∫H
0
∫ φM (γE)
γE
fB (γB) fE (γE) dγBdγE,
W2 =
∫ +∞
H
∫ +∞
γE
fB (γB) fE (γE) dγBdγE, H ,
I−1M (log2M −Rs) and φM (γ) , I−1M (Rs + IM (γ)).
Besides, Pr (γB < γE) is given by Pr (γB < γE) = Q1+Q2,
where Q1 =
∫H
0
∫ γE
0 fB (γB) fE (γE) dγBdγE and Q2 =∫ +∞
H
∫ γE
0 fB (γB) fE (γE) dγBdγE. Note that we can obtain
W2+Q2 =
∫ +∞
H fE (γE)
∫ +∞
0
fB (γB) dγBdγE = 1−FE (H)
and W1 + Q1 =
∫H
0 fE (γE)
∫ φM (γE)
0 fB (γB) dγBdγE =∫H
0
FB (φM (γE)) fE (γE) dγE. Based on (13), the SOP
can be written as Po (Rs) = (W1 +W2) + (Q1 +Q2) =
(W1 +Q1) + (W2 +Q2) =
∫H
0 FB (φM (γE)) fE (γE) dγE +
1− FE (H), which completes the proof of Lemma 1.
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